Samizdata

As you can imagine, there have been a lot of attempts to make sense of what Mr Trump is trying to do about tariffs. As of the time of my writing this, the dollar is coming under pressure, Mr Trump appears to be ratcheting up the tariff war with China to even higher levels, and there are signs that a few of his allies are getting nervous (seriously, how on earth can he have people working in his government such as Elon Musk and Peter Navarro who talk to each other in this way?)

One way to think about the the US/rest of world imbalances is that this is about production and consumption. In various ways, countries such as Germany, Japan and China produce a lot, and tend to be careful on how much they consume; on the flipside, the US loves to consume. As Joseph Sternberg in the Wall Street Journal puts it:

The core of Intellectual Trumpism runs as follows: The global economy is characterized by large, policy-induced imbalances in both trade and capital flows. These are caused at root by the decisions of some large economies—Germany, Japan and especially China are the usual suspects—to subsidize production by suppressing consumption in their domestic economies. This creates “surplus” output that they foist on the U.S.

This view isn’t wrong, so far as it goes. Those economies and others historically deployed a range of policy tools to boost exports. In China, the most egregious manifestations are direct subsidies for exporting companies. Less visible to foreign eyes is the financial repression: the deliberate suppression of domestic interest rates and political control of credit to subsidize businesses (which benefit from cheap borrowing) at the expense of consumers (who receive less income from their saving and investment). Such policies can take many forms. In Germany, extensive subsidies shield large companies—meaning exporters—from the worst energy-price consequences of Berlin’s dumb net-zero climate policies. Households pay full freight for electricity.

This is an interesting point about the control of credit and yes, Net Zero, intersecting in ways that suppress consumption and encourage production, much of which has to go overseas – to places like the US.

Sternberg continues:

Because other economies under-consume, the argument runs, they accumulate excess savings. They recycle these savings into the U.S., where we transform foreign claims (in the form of equity investments or purchases of American debt) into consumption of the foreign country’s excess production. Hey presto, a trade deficit.

An oddity of this argument is how little agency the U.S. is said to exercise. Once Washington had made the first mistake of opening our economy via tariff reductions and the free flow of capital, it was off to the races.

The truth is much more complex, and politically challenging: While some other economies suppress domestic consumption and subsidize export production, Americans choose to do almost exactly the opposite. Through political choices such as suppressing energy production and distribution, or permitting red tape and the like, or any number of other policy foibles, we make it much harder than it otherwise would be to produce things in the U.S. Meanwhile, you can’t take a step in America without tripping over a consumption subsidy.

So what has the US been doing to encourage consumption?

To cite a few: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stimulate overconsumption of housing. Subsidized student loans stimulate overconsumption of higher education (which, given the poor lifetime earnings prospects of many degrees, should indeed be understood as consumption rather than as an investment in human capital). The earned-income tax credit creates complex distortions that at the margin subsidize consumption while discouraging additional productive work.

Most glaring, though, are our entitlements. Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, not to mention a raft of other benefit programs, funnel vast quantities of money into consumption. The trick here is that we’re able to finance these via chronic fiscal deficits funded by foreign investors, meaning at the margin Americans borrow from the rest of the world at ultralow interest rates and funnel the cash into consumption at home.

And as the writer says, the “root-cause” solution to the trade deficit issue, to the extent that it is a problem that governments should address, is to rebalance – get rid of consumption subsidies and stop penalising production. That means, for instance, rolling back regulations, zoning laws, etc. (To the limited extent that this is being done by Trump, that is a mark in his favour.)

Some elements of such an agenda can be popular, as Mr. Trump is discovering with his deregulation and cheaper-energy drives. But the entitlement half is a minefield. Republicans are reluctant even about dialing back Medicaid benefits for able-bodied working-age people. The last time anyone tried to reform Social Security, President George W. Bush backed allowing a portion of payroll tax payments to flow into individual investment accounts. The existing system creates a consumption subsidy by transforming tax payments into transfers to recipients; the reform would have created a form of investment subsidy. That bit of good sense degenerated into a traumatic political fiasco for the GOP.

This the key. Social Security and other big entitlement programmes in the US are, as they are in the UK and much of the West, popular with ordinary voters; and the voters who switched from the Democrats to Republicans in 2016 and 2024 aren’t going to be happy to see these programmes reformed or reduced. It is therefore easy to see why tariffs are a tempting technique – it is easier to go on about those naughty, over-producing Asians and Germans as being at fault, rather than because incentives are structured as they are.

Sternberg concludes:

Note that the end result [of tariffs] is in one way the same as entitlement reform: less U.S. consumption, only via the demand suppression of higher import prices. But beyond that, the two policies diverge—and not to Intellectual Trumpism’s advantage. Among many other problems, protectionism risks depressing domestic production, a warning emerging from industries across America whose supply chains are imperiled by tariffs. It certainly doesn’t help domestic productivity. Entitlement reform, by contrast, tends to be an enormous supply-side spur to future economic growth that benefits households as inflation-adjusted wages rise.

The problem, however, is that entitlement reform is very hard to do, politically. There are some things that will also be politically tough: not everyone likes deregulation, given how occupational licensing and so on often shields vested interests. (Think of how the London mayor tried to hit Uber, at the urging of the traditional taxi sector, a few years ago.) Zoning laws are a problem but they are also supported by people who want to protect the value of their properties, as they see them, and so on. In certain countries, the planning system is so convoluted that it is a major brake on production. Fixing all this takes political will and the risk of antagonising vested interests.