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Tim Worstall – back in harness after running for office as a UKIP MEP – writes about the Labour government’s stated desire to ensure that not a single tract of the UK is without broadband access. It is the sort of techie, practical measure that Mr Gordon Brown thinks will help win him a bit of respect in the traditional Tory and LibDem shires.
As Tim says, the logic of this idea is questionable. There are geographical, physical reasons why broadband access, or indeed other forms of communications, are not available everywhere, all the time. Also, as the comment thread attached to Tim’s piece reveals, there is this argument, that I have raised before – also prompted by one of Tim’s articles – about why people feel that because X or Y wants a road, canal, power cables, whatever, that therefore the state should be able to use compulsory purchase powers, and taxation, to pay for whatever it is that is wanted. I have referred to this mindset as “brute utilitarianism”. Also, it is a cost of living in the countryside that one does not always have the same degree of speedy access to certain things that one has living in a town or city. That’s life, so folk should deal with it. (One of the few arguments for land value taxes is that people living in such remote places would, other things being equal, pay less taxes also. However, there are other problems with LVT as the Austrian school of economics points out, attractive at first blush though the idea might be).
I pay more to live in my rabbit hutch apartment in Pimlico and for the same outlay I could live in a big place in the sticks. But for the benefit of living in SW1, I get quick access to airports (a short trip from Victoria to Gatwick); the Tube, buses, taxis, broadband access, etc. This is part of the cost “package”, if you like, that comes with my locational choice. A person who lives in a remote area and who demands Pimlico or New York-style communcations is demanding that the citizens of a city should subsidize that preference. And yet many of the people who migrate from the towns to the country are quite well off; as I have noted in my native Suffolk, as soon as the townies settle in, they start demanding all kinds of amenities, not realising, or caring, that such things don’t exist because they are relatively expensive to put in rural areas, which is precisely why Mr and Mrs Chartered Accountant can afford to live in their nice village cottages in the first place.
Sometimes such debates are as easy as this: if people want something, then damn well pay for it yourself, and do not use the robber powers of the state to grab it off someone else.
Rant over.
Er, not quite: my reference to LVT brought out a crop of Henry George “land-is-special!” types on the comment board. Several of us have responded to them, but I came across this nice essay by Jan Narveson, which I think is one of the best smackdowns for the land value tax mob that I have ever read. Excerpt:
Now, the point of this little essay is that that is basically all there is to it, and there doesn’t need to be anything else. The idea that we all have an equal right to the land is amazingly arbitrary, and contrary to all human experience while it’s at it. It’s arbitrary in that it has no basis. The fact that we don’t make the land is irrelevant, as already seen: we don’t make the natural part of anything we have or own, no matter whether we have “made” it or not. But the point is, it doesn’t matter. For things are just things: they do not come with labels saying that they “belong” to some people or that some people, somehow, have a “claim” on them, nor in turn that everybody has a claim on them, equal or otherwise.
The late Peter (Lord) Bauer, a Hungarian-born economist who lived for much of his life in the UK, did outstanding work in demonstrating why markets and trade are superior to overseas aid, and pointed out how aid, and the organisations that often get involved in delivering it, frequently make problems of poverty worse, not better. Even aid advocates like Sir Bob Geldof will readily concede, meanwhile, that aid delivery becomes next to impossible during conditions of war, and when countries are under the rule of armed thugs. So last night’s Channel 4 programme on Somalia will have surprised few regulars at this blog.
What was interesting was how local traders were allegedly bribing some aid officials to take sacks of food and then sell it into the market. We were meant to be appalled by this, and part of me was. But also I also could not ignore the fact that this part of Africa seems to be buzzing with a sort of entrepreneurial class of men – one did not see many women – who trade in, and take great efforts to obtain, food and other stuff. That surely suggests that a market, of sorts, works in this part of the world. But what clearly does not work is the rule of law, or the enforcement of property rights. Without due protection for the latter, in particular, then the indestructible desire to “truck and barter” can all too easily degrade into a form of banditry. But let’s be clear here: while one can be nauseated at foreign aid being filched by some of the locals, that desire to trade is not, in itself, the problem. It is, in fact, part of the solution to the poverty of Africa.
Meanwhile, I strongly recommend William Easterly’s book on foreign aid and the mistakes that well-intentioned folk make about aid.
Some right-wing Americans got very upset when Jon Stewart, the TV comedy/news guy, monstered the CNBC “Mad Money” front-man Jim Cramer a few months ago. They had a point; it is clear that at least in some of his shows, Stewart tacks left. But whether unwittingly or otherwise, he was very fair in an interview recently with Peter Schiff – who by the way is possibly running for political office. Mr Schiff is a hard-money capitalist, an attacker of the Fed, of the bailouts of Bush/Obama. I wrote about him a while back. And Schiff used the platform of this very popular show to beat the drum for free markets, sound money, and getting rid of the Fed.
Good for Jon Stewart, at least on this occasion, for giving Schiff a platform.
My good friend in the US, Russell E. Whitaker, has plugged this excellent lecture in a Facebook posting (thanks Russell!). The lecture is delivered by the investor and commentator, Peter Schiff. It runs for one hour and 16 minutes, so you will want to find an appropriate time to brew up some coffee or pour your favourite tipple, relax and enjoy. He is an entertaining speaker, who makes the issues intelligible without dumbing down. He also has ideas on how to protect your money during the fallout.
It should be seen in conjunction with this book, by Thomas E. Woods, that I have mentioned a few times before. As these men observe, it is nonsense for policymakers like Gordon Brown, Alan Greenspan, etc, to blame what has happened on reckless private individuals, “greedy” Wall Street bankers, and so on. What happened was clearly predictable once one understands how incentives to save, borrow, invest and spend have been skewed by ultra-cheap central bank credit, the moral-hazard drivers of state regulations, bailouts, and the rest.
I rather liked Mr Schiff’s idea that Bernard Madoff, the Ponzi fraudster, is ideally qualified to run the US Treasury Department, given his er, skills.
Update: After queries, I put another link on as there appear to have been some problems with it the first time around.
There is a Reuters story quoting a survey suggesting that the recession could trigger a general increase in violence around the world. As is always important in these kind of claims, we need to be sure that correlation between two things – violence and economic uncertainty – is not being conflated with causation. Consider: Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s when the world, in general, was quite prosperous, albeit coming out of a short recession in countries such as the US and UK, when the price of oil had also been falling. The violence that broke out in the MEast later in parts of Africa (think Sudan, think USS Cole) took place in the middle to late-1990s, a period when emerging market economies were generally on the rise. The exceptions may prove the rule: what I think is true is that places that are felt, rightly or wrongly, to be unfairly excluded from a global prosperity are often likely to be unstable, and quite violent, but not always.
In fact, it is even arguable that greater prosperity might even cause some forms of violence if reactionary/religious groups regard such wealth as a defilement of whatever it is they want to protect. (I happen to think that explains why some anti-globalisation folk are often, in essence, reactionary snobs). That in part explains the argument of those who said that the West was attacked on 9/11 not for its supposed transgressions in the Middle East, but for its wealth and freedom per se.
Where I think economics does play a more direct role is where you have regimes that are financially busted, with few remaining resources, and where they greedily, and desperately, eye other, resource-rich nations nearby. That explains some, but not all, military campaigns. As in the case of Japan during the 1930s, a hunger for raw materials, coupled with a militaristic ruling ideology and elite, led to the Japanese conquests in parts of East Asia and the Pacific Rim. The same happened with Argentina and its invasion of the Falklands Islands in 1982 (the islands are supposedly close to some very big oil reserves). Ceasar’s conquest of Gaul had a partly economic incentive (all that gold, slaves, etc). And so on.
There may also be some evidence that the more prosperous we are, the more tolerant we are, too. In fact tolerance, which is allied to liberty, and prosperity, are faces of the same coin. In the minds of the great Victorian champions of free trade, such as Richard Cobden and John Bright, free trade and peace went hand in hand. A bit naive, maybe – trade routes need to be protected against thieves and thugs – but it is a view based on an essentially benign view of how most of us live our lives, given half a chance.
Even in Britain, the headlines this morning are full of the imminent bankruptcy filing of GM. It is, as one report points out, the biggest bankruptcy in US industrial history, setting an unenviable record. Several things stand out as I looked through the details but one immediately grabbed my attention: the US taxpayer could be on the hook for up to $60 billion on account of state assistance. $60 billion. I guess we all get so punch-drunk with the vast sums involved in bank bailouts and the like that the significance of these sums becomes a little fuzzy (or maybe it was that white wine I had at the BBQ yesterday). $60 billion of money that is being spent to rescue part of a veteran auto firm will be money that will not be available to fund, say, a new set of business startups in the US. GM has highly recognisable brands and a lot of well organised workers. Pretty much everyone has heard of it, has heard of Detroit’s status as a car-making town. So, naturally, there is big media and political interest in what happens to GM. All those thousands of jobs on the line, etc. But the entrepreneurs, taxpayers and consumers who will see their wallets lifted, business plans stymied, or car purchases affected – who speaks for them? Taken as a whole, far more people will be affected by the cost of paying to sort out GM than the management and workers, but given the dynamics, it is usually far easier for politicians to portray themselves as “saving” a firm by spending or “investing” (sic) public money than it is to accept, however painfully, that a firm needs to be broken up and capital released for other, more productive things. (It needs to be remembered that GM’s problems pre-date the credit crunch).
The French classical liberal economist, Frederic Bastiat, wrote a famous essay, “What is seen and what is not seen”. He was attacking things like subsidies and tariffs. And not a word of his essay is out of date.
I suppose they deserve half a clap for trying, if not for the rigour of argumentation. Crooked Timber, a leftish blog I read occasionally, tries to deny that flexible, relatively lightly regulated labour markets have fared better, or are superior to, the more heavily regulated, European ones, such as in France and Germany. Oh really? Let me quote a couple of lines:
“According to the latest Eurostat data, the unemployment rate in the US was equal to that in the EU-15 in March, and is now likely to be higher. Writing in the NY Times, Floyd Norris refers to the conventional wisdom that flexibility inherent in the American system — it is easier to both hire and fire workers than in many European countries implies that unemployment should be lower (at any given point in the business cycle) in the US than in Europe.”
It is “conventional wisdom” in the sense that it makes sense. Other things being equal – which they never are, of course – if you increase the cost, and hassle, of both hiring someone, and make it more expensive and difficult to fire someone if they fail to come up to scratch for any reason, then fewer people in general get hired. And it strikes me that that holds pretty robustly. Yes, unemployment may currently be as bad, percentage-wise, across the US as a whole as across the whole of the euro zone, although let it be noted that different parts of the US have differing rates of unemployment, as does the euro zone. But as the next paragraph demonstrates, it really will not do to try and claim that heaping labour markets with more costs and rules has few adverse effects:
Advocates of the US system make much of the deterrent to hiring associated with employment protection laws, but they ignore the other side of the coin. When the economy is contract, employment protection laws do in fact protect employment (if they did not, they would have no adverse effect on hiring either). On this basis there is nothing surprising in what we are seeing. EU unemployment rates should be higher in expansions and lower in contractions, which is exactly what is required for lower variance.
But – and it is a big but – if monetary policy is not run by idiots, thereby avoiding boom-bust cycles of great severity, then overall, the low-regulation labour market fares better, in the medium to long-run, than the alternative. If wage rates are allowed to fall in a recession, rather than be held up via artificial means, then yes, you will get, as America did in the early 1920s for example, a sharp, but short contraction, followed by a rapid recovery. But if you load lots of rules and regulations on, you get a 1930s-style decade of high, double-digit unemployment. And in measuring the impact of labour market laws, the duration of a period of high unemployment is as bad as, if not worse, than a period of high, but short-lived, unemployment.
And let’s not forget that in France, for instance, the country had high unemployment rates for much of the 1990s and early ‘Noughties, when much of the Western economy was booming on the back of cheap commodities, the rise of the BRICs, the dotcom boom, the Cold War “dividend”, and impact of partial free market advances in the US, the UK and some other countries. And yet hundreds of thousands, even millions, of Frenchmen and women, let it not be forgotten, languished on the dole or make-work projects. In 2005, for example, French unemployment was above 10 per cent.
Here is quite a balanced account of the benefits of a supposedly flexible labour market, including the pros and cons. This extensive study comes down pretty firmly on the side of the view that flexible labour markets are good overall.
In a way, what this comes down to is the trade-off between security for those who have a job already versus the freedoms of those who want to get another one or any job at all. To pretend that things such as regulations and costs of firing people will not influence behaviour is to deny that incentives matter, or that they affect welfare.
“There is an almost universal assumption that the next government, of whatever stripe, will be imposing new taxes to avoid a junk-bond future. This easy option should not be allowed to run its course without challenge, because it ignores the risk of turning Britain into a junk economy of high taxes and low growth. It is no coincidence that the pressure to bring tax havens to heel has become intense over the past six months. So panicked were the finance ministers of the G20 nations about the risk of capital flight from the grabbing State that a campaign of bullying was launched against a small group of nations that refuse to accept that the State has the power to achieve absolute dominion over private wealth.”
Carl Mortished. He is writing about California, and the lessons of that indebted US state for the euro zone and Britain.
I love the headline on this piece in the Spectator by Matthew Lynn. I don’t think he is talking about our own Brian Micklethwait, but he could be.
Mr Lynn is talking about the risk, now rising, that the UK will have its sovereign debt ratings cut, a fact that means the UK government has to pay higher interest rates to investors wishing to hold UK gilts. I suspect the US could be headed for a similar fate.
Hopey-change!
Very smart article by Niall Ferguson on the lessons to be drawn from the financial crisis. As one would expect, many of the wrong lessons have been learned by policymakers. As he says, the 1970s was a period of relatively heavy financial regulation and state controls over part of the banking system, and yet it was a grim period economically (unless you happened to be an OPEC oil producer). He also picks up on the point that Canada, which operates a broadly free market banking system, has not suffered anything like so badly as its neighbour, or indeed the UK. That’s mightily inconvenient for our own Gordon Brown in claiming that the crisis was like swine flu or a meteorite impact from outer space, rather than something that was caused in many cases right on his doorstep.
Thomas E Woods – whom I mentioned the other day – hits back most satisfyingly at Matthew Yglesias. The latter had some sniffy thoughts about Mr Woods’ recent book on the financial crisis. For the sin of looking at the crisis through the perspective of Austrian economics, with its specific way of looking at the economic cycle and the role of banking, Mr Woods incurs a certain amount of sneering from Mr Yglesias.
Mr Woods gets the distinct impression that Yglesias has not read his book. I have no idea whether he has or not; but there does seem to be a recent pattern of leftists trashing the likes of FA Hayek, or whomever, in a way that suggests that they haven’t the faintest idea of what or who they are talking about. You can just picture the thought process that goes through Mr Yglesias’s mind: “Ah, these central Europeans with their funny names and their think tanks – who are they to question the great Keynes and his sensible ideas on demand management”.
But I detect a sign that perhaps, just perhaps, the Yglesiases of this world are losing some of their Olympian self-confidence. At a City event the other night, listening to people talking about the economy, I did not get the impression from all the associated financial types that the idea of using the printing press to cure problems caused by underpriced credit was regarded as very brilliant. In fact quite a few folk are mentioning inflation as the issue that could hit Real Soon Now.
Thomas E. Woods is great value. Check out his website.
The first 10% off public spending could be painless for the public and popular.
– John Redwood
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