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Even in Great Britain …

In light of the recent damage and imminent destruction of the right of habeas corpus in the United States of America, it is with mixed feelings I point out the following observations by James Madison (or possibly Alexander Hamilton) in Federalist Paper 53.

The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government.


Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted.


… and hence the doctrine [of annual elections] has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government?

24 comments to Even in Great Britain …

  • Nick M

    I used to believe that democracy was paramount. I used to believe it was the highest thing any state could aspire towards.

    Then I came here. Thank you Mr Marks, thank you Mr De Havilland. I no longer believe that. There are inviolate rights which are beyond democracy and (for shame) I’ve only recently recognised quite how smart the founding fathers of the USA actually were. For shame.

    They got it nearly 300 years ago. I got it about 6 months ago. I’ve gotta go out and buy a wig, I’ve gotta play catch-up.

    I always knew there was a reason I loved the USA and, well, I now know why.

  • Chris Harper


    There are issues which simply are not subject to democratic decision, and most everyone recognises this, although many don’t realise it.

    Few people would concede that their neighbour should have any say in how often they make love to their spouse; this being the case they accept a limit to democratic decision making. The issue now is simply one of where to draw the line.

    Unfortunately many people also cannot distinguish between their inalienable right to an opinion on a matter, and a spurious right to a say on that matter, so they will insist on a say on how often I may be permitted to make love. The most appropriate response we can make to these people is to calmly, and with logic, inform them why they are wrong. It is only when this fails that we beat their faces to a pulp.

  • nic

    Next month: “The government announced today that couples will have to consult the local community on how much to make love. Local authorities will issue consultation packs for local neighbourhoods…”

  • andrew duffin

    “Even in Great Britain”

    I am not sure exactly what you mean by using this headline, but be assured, habeas corpus is under just as much attack here (in the UK) as it is in the US.

    Blair hates all due process and wishes to rule by decree, supported by summary justice without the inconvenience of presumption of innocence, open and fair trials, habeas corpus, and all the rest.

    Slowly but surely he is getting his way, and no political power opposes him, because every political power can see how useful to its own ends such an outcome would be.

  • Midwesterner


    It is an excerpt from part of the quoted text:

    Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision.

    I chose it because in the same breath, he recognizes Great Britain as the originating point of our concept of constitutional rights and at the same time points out that without a constitution that binds the government, those rights are unobtainable.

    In addition to sharing with non-US readers some of Madison/Hamiltons thoughts on the necessity of a constitution preeminent to government, I want the thought not to be lost on US readers who believe ever that pragmatic actions must be taken at the expense of the constitutional principle.

    Habeas corpus is ‘merely’ the power to demand the law be unheld. When the power to demand that “the laws be faithfully executed.” is rationed, the constitution itself ceases to be anything more than an ornament.

  • guy herbert

    I am not sure exactly what you mean by using this headline

    Hint: What Hamilton meant, figuratively. A rhetorical effect can be enhanced by a change in context.

  • dearieme

    But the American experiment has one huge weakness: the Supreme Court is supreme and its members can ignore the Constitution whenever the spirit moves them. Which seems to be quite often. How can this basic design flaw be avoided in, say, a future British Constitution?

  • Midwesterner

    No dearieme, they cannot. To quote the 7th president, Andrew Jackson’s statement to Chief Justice Marshall in 1832 in regard to the Supreme Court decision in Worcester v. Georgia:

    “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!”

    It requires the complicity of at least the executive branch. This is part of the ‘Balance of Powers’.

  • Midwesterner

    This is why I also see the death of constitutionalism to be eminent. By some counts, 4 of the 9 justices on the supreme court believe in something called the “Unitary Executive Theory“. With one more Supreme Court appointment, all may be lost. I don’t think I’m exaggerating.

    It’s ironic that Federalists, which fear out of control government in the form of an unrestrainable legislative branch, should throw us into the clutches of an elected absolute monarch.

  • dearieme

    Midwesterner: what complicity did Wade-Roe require?

  • RAB

    I just read some of that Mid,
    and it is tunnel vision scary!!
    Drop down that wormhole and who knows where we all come out.

  • Midwesterner


    I’m not sure I understand your question. That decision was wrong on many levels, but, unlike Worcester v. Georgia, the executive did enforce the SCOTUS decision.

  • But the American experiment has one huge weakness: the Supreme Court is supreme and its members can ignore the Constitution whenever the spirit moves them. Which seems to be quite often. How can this basic design flaw be avoided in, say, a future British Constitution?

    And that is truly the ‘million dollar question’. In the end no system purporting to support liberty can survive without an underpinning culture of liberty. There must be a critical mass of people who will just refuse to accept own repression, no matter if that repression is sanctified by a court or a popular vote.

  • i rember the con. party.im old enouht to rember the 4 day week when england had no elctric. and no work . when 6 million were out of work. im not saying the labour party has done better. thay have crashed our and i mean n.h.s. all prime misisters have made a good living from being there look at magge and her son and daughter, hows about the people who give there life to make england free for the english not for immigants now the people we made this land free for wish to bloww us up or behead us it discust me partys in or out of power. in disberlief god save the qeen of england.

  • guy herbert

    In the end no system purporting to support liberty can survive without an underpinning culture of liberty.

    Agreed. And what are necessary to nourish a culture of liberty are state and civil institutions having some independence of one another as well as interdependence. Which is why I think a lot of gripes against the US Courts (and still, just, the British ones) from people who don’t like this or that decision are misconceived. As long as courts make their decisions on grounds in law, and not to please politicians or bureaucrats, then they keep alive the possibility of rule of law and liberty under the law.

    Britain’s big problem is that legislature and executive have ceased to be independent, and the executive is progressively crushing rule of law. I think the US may be more subtly losing sight of liberty under the law as the executive power is exercised with legalistic twisting.

  • John Thacker


    I would consider at least reading an actual legal analysis of Attorney General Gonzales’s testimony.

    1950’s Johnson v. Eisentrager explicitly heled that detainees in Germany had no habeas corpus rights. 2004’s Rasul v. Bush held that the Guantanamo detainees did have habeas rights, based on this passage:

    “Not only are petitioners differently situated from the Eisentrager detainees, but the Court in Eisentrager made quite clear that all six of the facts critical to its disposition were relevant only to the question of the prisoners’ constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus. The Court had far less to say on the question of the petitioners’ statutory entitlement to habeas review.”

    The Court ruled in Rasul that statutory changes in habeas corpus since 1950 have broadened the statutory right to habeas corpus, and that the Guantanamo detainees fell under that. It most definitely did not rule on the constitutional right to habeas corpus.

    It has been fairly clear in US history that, at least up to 1950, there was no automatic assumption that habeas corpus rights extended to non-citizens captured in military operations, or indeed perhaps to non-citizens generally. (Or, it seems pre-1950s, to members of the military.)

    Congress is free to grant habeas corpus rights by statute beyond what the Constitution requires. The Supreme Court, in Rahul v. Bush did not decide that the Guantanamo detainees had absolutely protected Constitutional rights to habeas corpus, which would have required overruling Johnson v. Eisentrager, but did argue that the current statutory construction of the writ gave them those rights.

    It is difficult for me to see how this must amount to a damage or imminent destruction of the right of habeas corpus. It certainly seems off to me to quote the Federalist Papers in the way that you did. The concept of habeas corpus not apply to noncitizens captured in military excursions outside the country when they were written, and nor did they apply at least until the 1950s. It is a relatively new thread in Constitutional thinking to apply Constitutional protections to all noncitizens as well.

    However, as mentioned, Congress is certainly free to go beyond what the Constitution requires when it comes to protecting civil liberties. (Indeed, to “change, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government,” so long as more protection is added.) It would I think be ridiculous to argue that Congress may not be more protective. However, if Congressional statutes are allowed to be more protective than the Constitution, then Congress is also allowed to go no further than what the Constitution requires.

    It is perfectly reasonable to argue that habeas corpus should extend further than its original conception, whether by statute or by changing Constitutional interpretation. The Court, however, in its recent ruling indeed held that habeas corpus rights were granted to the detainees by statute, not by the Constitution.

  • John Thacker


    This is distinctly different from the ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfield of 2004, which did involve a US citizen and in which the Court did rule that the Constitutional right of habeas corpus was violated. In that case, yes, the sacred right was quite plainly violated, and the Executive has indeed been forced (quite properly) to abide by the decision.

    However, in Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court (which rules on US statutes as well as the Constitution) found only that the statutory right to habeas corpus was violated (reserving finding whether or not the detainees differed sufficiently from Johnson v. Eisentrager in order to have the Constitutional right). Thus, the Administration was well within the bounds of the ruling to ask that the statutes be changed so as not to apply to non-citizen detainees captured in military operations outside the country and held there.

    It is inaccurate to say that the Administration has not followed the ruling. There is a distinction between what the Constitution requires and how far statutes may go in addition to protect a right. (Though indeed, after a long period of time of statutory protection, certain rights may well be incorporated into one’s idea of the Constitution.)

  • John Thacker

    I should add that the actions against Hamdi (the citizen) were blatantly unconstitutional, and should absolutely never have happened and that those actions, unlike those in Rasul or the response to it, definitely did indicate insufficient regard for civil liberties. Thankfully the Administration has followed the (very strong, near unanimous) Supreme Court ruling in that case.

  • Midwesterner

    The problem is not that the Supreme Court can ignore the constitution, it is that it sometimes does. The problem is not with the concept of a rule book and officials to make the calls, it is how those officials are selected that is the problem.

    I don’t have an idea for a better system in the US although it would function closer to the founders expections if we repealed the 17th amendment. But, that said, if I was a citizen of the UK, I would be very loath to dilute or do away with hereditary peerages in the Lords. Until the NL put peerages on the auction block, that was one of the least prone to tampering methods of selection possible. While I’m sure that system has many problems, I’m equally sure that, like the US Senate prior to the 17th amendment, many of those bugs were features.

  • Midwesterner

    John, any number of points on which you are wrong. You said:

    It would I think be ridiculous to argue that Congress may not be more protective.

    “Protective” is not a useable word in this context. Congress may not as a general pattern of logic be MORE protective as the rights inshrined in the constitution are prohibitive rather than prescriptive. Your statement suggesting congress is able to grant additional ‘rights’ suggests rights of the “chicken in every pot” variety. The only power the congress has to ‘grant’ rights, is to refrain from exercising constitutional powers granted to it.

    You said:

    “the Executive has indeed been forced (quite properly) to abide by the decision.”

    No John. The executive has been requested or instructed. There is no mechanism to “force” the executive to do anything. That is why the opinions of the AG are so very significant.

    Also, John, you said:

    The Court ruled in Rasul that statutory changes in habeas corpus since 1950 have broadened the statutory right to habeas corpus, and that the Guantanamo detainees fell under that. It most definitely did not rule on the constitutional right to habeas corpus.

    If by “rule” you mean ‘express an opinion on’, you are completely wrong. Have you read the decision? While they did use statute:

    Congress has granted federal district courts, “within their respective jurisdictions,” the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §§2241(a), (c)(3).

    They clearly went on to point out the constitutional foundation of their decision. Also from their decision:

    Habeas corpus is, however, “a writ antecedent to statute, . . . throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.” Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 484, n. 2 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). The writ appeared in English law several centuries ago, became “an integral part of our common-law heritage” by the time the Colonies achieved independence, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 485 (1973), and received explicit recognition in the Constitution, which forbids suspension of “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,” Art. I, §9, cl. 2.

    As it has evolved over the past two centuries, the habeas statute clearly has expanded habeas corpus “beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th centuries.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 380, n. 13 (1977). But “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 301 (2001). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”). As Justice Jackson wrote in an opinion respecting the availability of habeas corpus to aliens held in U. S. custody:

    “Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 218–219 (1953) (dissenting opinion).

    Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court has recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace. The Court has, for example, entertained the habeas petitions of an American citizen who plotted an attack on military installations during the Civil War, Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866), and of admitted enemy aliens convicted of war crimes during a declared war and held in the United States, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and its insular possessions, In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
    The question now before us is whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not “ultimate sovereignty.”6

    And you sooooo clearly didn’t read the decision that I’m a little annoyed to have to go here. But a little farther on, in clear statement they say:

    The Court of Appeals instead held that petitioners had a constitutional right to habeas corpus secured by the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2, reasoning that “if a person has a right to a writ of habeas corpus, he cannot be deprived of the privilege by an omission in a federal jurisdictional statute.” Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F. 2d, at 965. In essence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the habeas statute, as construed in Ahrens, had created an unconstitutional gap that had to be filled by reference to “fundamentals.” 174 F. 2d, at 963. In its review of that decision, this Court, like the Court of Appeals, proceeded from the premise that “nothing in our statutes” conferred federal-court jurisdiction, and accordingly evaluated the Court of Appeals’ resort to “fundamentals” on its own terms. 339 U. S., at 768.8

    Because subsequent decisions of this Court have filled the statutory gap that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to “fundamentals,” persons detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas review.

    Now in case understanding is still eluding you, here it is in simple terms:

    The statute of habeas corpus is an implementation of the constitutional right, not an extension of it.

    You are so wrong on Rasul v Bush that I can only believe that you are taking Volokh Conspiracy as gospel. I have a suggestion for you.


  • Midwesterner

    John Thacker,

    Please forgive the tone of my previous comment. Nothing in your comments warranted the nature of my response. I said early on that occasionally some things would cause me to blow a gasket and habeas corpus most certainly is one of those things.

    It is close to the surface and doesn’t take much to set me off.

    When I see that smirking ijjit sitting proclaiming ‘truth’ he has found in the constitution and common law that was somehow overlooked by two and a quarter centuries of constitutional jurisprudence and eight hundred years of common law, my reaction is appropriately one of doubt and poorly restrained disgust.

    I heard what Sen Specter said, I heard what AG Gonzales said, and apparently unlike most oppinionators, I read the decision they were discussing.

    Please let me explain the philosophical reasons driving my intensity on this matter.

    Habeas corpus means literally to bring the prisoner bodily to the court. While an actual bodily presence of the prisoner is no longer required in court, the root principle is still there.

    It means a right to petition that the laws be followed. It is the door to the protection of law that is the protection from unrestrainable tyranny. The law is like a light. It sits there, dark, until something turns it on. That something is a legal challange. To every human denied the right to challange their treatment on legal grounds, there is a complete vacuum of control over, or even knowledge of illegal conduct by government officials. Without habeas, laws are pointless. To say that someone may not have a writ of habeas corpus is to say that person does not exist in the eyes of the law.

    Think about that for a minute.

    That person does not exist in the eyes of the law.

    If that doesn’t scare the living !#$ out of you, you either have no imagination or no moral code.

    There is no more important fundamental element of constitutional government.

  • John


    I’m not sure I understand why you think habeas is in imminent danger in America; frankly I don’t see it. But in any case, the Constitution does not grant a “right” of habeas corpus:

    Article I Section 9
    The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

    What “right” to habeas corpus exists does so in statute, not in the Constitution. The Congress clealy has the power to suspend habeas which must certainly remove it from the status of a “Constitutional right”.

    dearieme :

    The Supreme Court is not abolutely supreme as you claim. As noted elsewhere “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!” But beyond that, the Congress has the power to control not only the purse of the Court, but more important the areas where they may act.

    Article III Section 2
    In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

    Congress has the authority to prevent the Supreme Court from acting as they see fit.

  • Midwesterner


    Your opinion, while popular, is preposterous. For one thing, your statement essentially is that since the constitution provides strict and non negotiable restrictions on when the right may be removed, that it is not a constitutional right. If your argument is extended to any degree, either it or the constitution crumbles to dust.

    Any right that the constitution protects in all cases except a very narrowly defined exception cannot possibly be demoted to a mere statutory right. The statutes are its implementation, not creation.

    You don’t understand why I think habeas is in imminent danger in America. It is the entire constitution that is in imminent danger. While Supreme Court decisions yet show a sound recognition of habeas, the executive does not show a sound recognition of the Supreme Court. Or the legislature either, for that matter. The executive fully controls the means by which the laws are enforced.

    The enforcement arm of the Judicial system is the US Marshals Service. It also is part of the Department of Justice and is administered by the Attorney General of the United States Who is subordinate to the President of the United States. The Director of the US Marshals Service is appointed by the President of the US with confirmation by the Senate.

    In 1832, US President Andrew Jackson with the popular support of the US legislature defied the Supreme Court, making clear that he would not permit the Executive power to support the court’s ruling in Worcester v. Georgia which was being defied by the state government of Georgia. The ordinary procedure in this case would have been for the SCOTUS to order the US Marshals to enforce the decision. However, as Jackson had made very clear that he did not intend to provide executive means to enforce (coerce was Jackson’s word) the court’s decision, they did not order out the marshals*. In doing this, they hoped to preserve the judicial weight of the decision as precedent, while not completely destroying the institution of the court in a battle they had no resources to win. Further, in helping to carry out acts subsequent to his threat, Jackson apparently had no problem with using that same executive authority to send 7000 troups to forcibly relocate 17,000 Cherokee.

    The consequence of Jackson’s action resulted in the forced relocation of many thousands of Cherokee, the Trail of Tears, and in the course of these acts, the deaths of approximately 4000 law abiding, (at least Supreme Court law abiding) Cherokees.

    This current president is defying both the Supreme Court and the legislature in a way that to the best of my knowledge is unprecedented in either reach or frequency in our nation’s entire history.

    Two of the best known authors of the constitution, Jefferson and Madison, served as presidents and had every opportunity and incentive to interpret the constitution to the maximum amount of effect they could legitimately constitutionally claim. None other than Jefferson in is official capacity as Secretary of State advised Washington that the veto power is the shield provided by the constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature of the rights of the Executive. Madison, when faced with a bill he supported but thought was unconstitutional praised the bill’s purposes, but said he couldn’t sign it because he thought it was unconstitutional. It is interesting to note that one time they did ‘conspire’ in support of what they believed was an unconstitutional act of legislation, they did it so that they might carry out, not defy, the will of congress.

    And yet we now have a president who signs legislation that he has negotiated with congress and then, with out the consent of either congress or the Supreme Court, selectively rejects parts of the legislation on the grounds of unconstitutionality while still exercising features of his own chosing. One way this occured was specifically referred to by Sen Specter in which he asked the Attorney General about a piece of legislation in which congress authorized the president to carry out certain previously illegal acts on the condition that he report some specific information to them regarding how he was using the newly granted power. He signed the entire act but is using the power and refusing to tell them how.

    This conduct, this attitude, these statements, both by the President and by the Attorney General are a clear defiance of the constitution beyond even that perpetrated by Jackson the led to the deaths of 4000 law abiding Cherokee at the hands of the US government.

    If you cannot see the need for a government to be constrained by a constitution, and if you cannot see the fundamental necessity for its actors to therefore be bound by that constitution , then I am at a loss of how to convey it to you. The executive’s rejection of habeas is just one symptom of its defiance.

    Arbitrary and unilateral action by executive authorities is one of the most ancient indications and even definitions of tyranny.

  • Midwesterner

    Well, my Feb 2 at 2:18P contained a glaring falsehood.

    It ignores ex parte Bollman (sp?) in which none other than Marshall finds that the rights in the constitution don’t exist until congress formally enacts them.

    Obviously, I think that’s crap and I’ve mixed opinions on Marshall. He’s credited as being the founder of judicial review but I often suspect he was a sour-grapes federalist player who played pure politics. But that may not be the case because one time he apparently did get the court to rule on principle, Worcester v. Georgia, the other two branches of government laughed in his face.

    Perry’s comment about culture of liberty is well taken, but it does need the underlying structure to be available for use when called on. And in ex parte Bollman, Marshall did incalculable harm to the concept of constitutional pre-eminence; or “laws and not men”. Liberty minded people who sought the protection of the constitution could be (and were) denied access as a consequence of that decision. A majority that favors liberty can be ham-strung by a totalitarian minority when the need for binding rules is not understood.

    The court seldom formally reverses itself. But I think as the intervening time has passed, the necessity of recognizing what the the court calls “fundamentals”, that is to say constitutional rights not written into the statute books, has become apparent and further, has been protected in their decisions.

    From time to time, usually during the waning years of war, an executive utilizing power needed to lead a war effort has tried to bring battle field rules home and into areas where the chaos of war does not reach. The courts now are correctly recognizing that the battle field rules are just that; rules for the battle field.

    I have been reading of General Homma; a general who was charged for crimes he had no knowledge of and then executed. By these rules, General Franks should have been charged with Abu Ghraib atrocities. And while I certainly believe these generals are accountable and were at least negligent (along with higher officials up to the top) I don’t like the idea of ‘trying’ defendents who have no access either to our constitutionally defined due process or to international law.

    The trial and execution of General Homma for not discovering and preventing the “Bataan Death March”, was not conducted under any system of review. Certainly I believe Homma should have been tried. But General MacArthur, who remember had given up his only major defeat to General Homma, selected the venue, the defense, the prosecution, the jury and the rules of evidence. The lead defense attorney MacArthur assigned was 27 years old and had never tried a case!

    But not to worry. The case was reviewed. By MacArthur.