We are developing the social individualist meta-context for the future. From the very serious to the extremely frivolous... lets see what is on the mind of the Samizdata people.
Samizdata, derived from Samizdat /n. - a system of clandestine publication of banned literature in the USSR [Russ.,= self-publishing house]
|
Facts and analysis Both of which are generally lacking in the public discourse, on the war in Iraq.
First, Mr. Scott accurately captures the view of Iraq held by the quagmiristas:
I can only imagine the perception that many Americans have of Iraq; some nation in the Middle East where jihadists multiply, the Iraqi security forces resemble the keystone cops, U.S. forces are helpless against roadside bombs, and the situation is so dire that only disengagement can solve the problem.
Sound familiar? It contrasts rather markedly with the data, which Mr. Scott summarizes to paint a picture of an Iraqi insurgency that peaked in the months before last year’s Presidential election (and Kerry still couldn’t beat Bush!), and is now transitioning from decline to defeat. Interesting stuff, and food for thought.
Its a damned shame you never see anything approaching this level of factual detail and context in the media, and even in most specialty press, accounts of the Iraqi war.
|
Who Are We? The Samizdata people are a bunch of sinister and heavily armed globalist illuminati who seek to infect the entire world with the values of personal liberty and several property. Amongst our many crimes is a sense of humour and the intermittent use of British spelling.
We are also a varied group made up of social individualists, classical liberals, whigs, libertarians, extropians, futurists, ‘Porcupines’, Karl Popper fetishists, recovering neo-conservatives, crazed Ayn Rand worshipers, over-caffeinated Virginia Postrel devotees, witty Frédéric Bastiat wannabes, cypherpunks, minarchists, kritarchists and wild-eyed anarcho-capitalists from Britain, North America, Australia and Europe.
|
A few comments on this report, which I think tells us little. Reminds me of the US Killed In Action graphs on Samizdata in Summer 2003, which showed our victory.
1. With a small # of data points, groups like this can give a misleading picture. Look at a monthly plot of Coalition casualties. No visible pattern over the past 2 years. The 12 month moving average has consiently risen; Nov was a new high.
This is thru Sept; an updated one will appear in the next few days:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/iraq_fatalities_9-05.pdf(Link)
2. Avoid selective use of data.
Why not show those totals for each period — certainly rising strongly! Also, all Iraq data varies greatly month to month. A 4 month decline in a rising trend might mean little.
3. Be wary about the numbers.
Iraq civilan death totals are contraversal. Insurgents arrested or killed are not only unreliable but mean almost nothing in a civil war – insurgency like Iraq’s.
4. What are the enemy’s metrics of victory?
I doubt they worry about their KIA. The number of suicide bombers KIA probably is a good thing to them.
Fourth Generation War — or to use the more conventional term, guerilla warfare — runs by different rules. The insurgents target our will to win, much as Sun Tzu recommended millenia ago in The Art of War.
These numbers mean nothing if their resolve remains strong and ours weakens.
For another forecast on Iraq see
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_forecasts_nov_2005.htm(Link)
The Iraq forecasts on DNI have proven prescient, more accurate than those of high prestige outfits like Stratfor and CSIS.
Quite so. The US military cannot be defeated in Iraq, it can only be defeated in the US Congress, but that would still be just as much a genuine victory for the jihadis as if they had driven the US forces into the Persian Gulf.
4. What are the enemy’s metrics of victory?
Good question. I doubt those metrics include a reasonably democratic constitution voted in by referendum, or a parliament, or a federalist system or 300,000 Iraqi military and paramilitaries gunning for them.
An equally good question would be: “What are the coalition metrics for victory?”
1. Removal of the Saddam Hussein family dictatorship.
2. Removal of the Baathist ruling elite.
3. Organization of Iraq society along democratic lines:
A) Decentralization of power
B) Convening of a constitutional convention.
C) Ratification of a constitution by the Iraqi people in a free election.
D) Election of a parliament.
E) Training of an Iraqi army along more western lines with tribalism deemphasized, human rights at higher priority, initiative devolved from the officer cadre to NCO’s and promotion by merit.
F) A growing, self sustaining economy.
G) Respect for basic civil rights (free press, free speech, voting, fair courts, etc)
By those metrics, coalition victory has been complete and unequivical. As soon as more Iraqi troops are trained up we can begin drawing ours down, having done exactly what we went in to accomplish.
By contrast, the jihadis who’re waging a mass murder campaign offer nothing to Iraqis but backwardness, rigid theocracy and a falling standard of living. The vast majority of Iraqis have rejected that path in no uncertain terms at every possible opportunity. The fact that guerrillas are going to wage a low-level war for some years into the future means tough times for the Iraqis but by no means presages overthrow of the elected govenment, Juan Cole’s hopes and dreams for insurgent victory notwithstanding.
MH –
I like your spirit, but suggest you reconsider the nature of this war.
It’s arguable that none of the things under “3” have been successfully acomplished.
Certainly not D, E, F, and G.
The Sunni’s largely boycotted the election for Convention delegates. The Convention never voted on the Consitution, which was changed after its last “reading” before them. And there were massive irregularities in the voting that approved it.
The Parliamentary election will be held this month, probably successfully. To what extent it works … we will see.
There is almost no Iraq Army, just sectarian/ethnic militia under that banner.
The economy is a wreck. Reconstruction almost totally halted in large areas.
As for civil rights, you must be kidding.
The only exception — a clear success — is (A) decentralization. Which we might have done so well that Iraq cannot be reassempled, with unknown consequences.
4th Generation warfare is a strange thing to us western folk, which is why we have won so few of them.
I suggest reading some of the articles on:
http://www.d-n-i.net(Link)
You’ll probably find it interesting material, mostly written by and for military/intelligence pros.
Every day in every way, things are getting better and better in Iraq.
They must be– the free, independent and incorruptible media of the new democracy say so:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-infowar2dec02,1,7627783.story?ctrack=1&cset=true
Killing 10 marines at a time is “transitioning from decline to defeat”? I can’t wait to see what complete defeat looks like!
John,
“Killing 10 marines at a time is “transitioning from decline to defeat”?”
Why not?
Context is all, and citing specific deaths in ambush does not tell us anything about the overall context.
“I can’t wait to see what complete defeat looks like!”
Good man, I can’t wait to see it either.
Context is all, and citing specific deaths in ambush does not tell us anything about the overall context
It tells us that after 2 years and eight months, the insurgents can strike at will, anywhere, anytime.
It tells us that after 2 years and eight months, soldiers are still dying at the rate of more than 2 per day.
Coalition forces will never “win” this war, and you’re foolish to believe they can. Cite all the numbers you want, it’s one big clusterf***.
John,
soldiers are still dying at the rate of more than 2 per day.
And the “insurgents” (foreign fighters) are dying at what? Twice, Five times? Ten times that number? By your own logic they must be losing even more badly than are we.
Interesting sort of conflict; one where both sides are losing.
Question is, which side will lose first?
Are they in a quagmire too?
He calls the 8 month point the “peak”; referring to monthly marine fatalities, I assume and then goes on to call the 12 month point the “decline” Simply because fatalities of American marines have decreased during this time, is not a clear indicator of a steady decline of any kind. His time frame is far too short to make such an assumption. If the war (and it is a war) drags on for another 3 years the monthly fatality rate could drastically fluctuate, with both ups and downs. This would render his so called “decline” rather incorrect. Furthermore, any number of factors other then insurgency failure could account for the lowered fatalities.
The Irish Civil war started in 1914, got hot and heavy in 1920 and 21, the country split into 3 factions, some based on religion, some based on denying the population a democratic vote (whether to accept the 1921 treaty or not).
More were killed in the Irish Civil War than the entire “black and tan” period. The retaliation on both sides got ugly. The war itself “petered out” because the insurgents lost the support of the common people.
Then, from 1923 to now, there’s been a “low level insurgency” going on that has achieved exactly nothing.
Guerilla warfare is a fascinating subject. The secret to waging one is to keep the pressure on, keep the general population “on side” or else cowed, have lots of money and material support from outside and fight a propaganda war very cleverly.
Great book on the subject: “The IRA at War 1916-1923” by Peter Hart.
Really? So you think the insurgents can choose any target in Iraq and strike it effectively? How does a roadside bomb equate to ‘striking anywhere at will’? Striking at a target of opportunity (a patrol via a roadside bomb) is hardly ‘striking anywhere’. Your remark is nonsensical.
And a nation of almost 300 million people can loose an attrition war by losing 2 people per day from a volunteer army? Some comparisons: More than 40,000 people typically die in traffic accidents in the USA each year. Britain lost almost 20,000 dead, (almost 60,000 casualties in total) on the first day of the battle of the Somme on July 1, 1916, so perhaps I could suggest you lack some historical perspective regarding what amounts of truly horrendous losses. Sorry to sound callous but 2 per day is not a lot of people when it comes to losses in a war. Pick a couple major metropolitan centres in the USA and I suspect that many people are murdered every day.
Why? What makes this insurgency so radically different that it cannot be won like so many before?
The British won a major victory against Communist guerillas in Malaya in 1952-54. Gerald Templer (who replaced an assassinated High Commissioner) fought them with a mixture of carrot and stick, in the knowledge that most locals did not support the Malayan Communist Party and resented their villages being occupied by it as armed bases. Templer sponsored land reform, forcing native rulers to distribute it. He created new well-guarded settlements and won hearts and minds: some credit him with inventing the phrase.
There was a set timetable for the independence of the country which the British adhered to. We had experience of low-level jungle warfare as a result of our humiliation by the Japanese in 1941-42. The back of the insurgency was broken in two years. Templer insisted on local Home Guards progressively assuming responsibility. His wife took the lead in organising relief. The Malayans felt he was on their side, with no ulterior economic motives.
These lessons were not learned by the USA in Vietnam. Its prior knowledge of the country was non-existent. It forced the abandonment of elections due in 1956 which would almost certainly have produced a big win for a Communist-dominated coalition under Ho Chi Minh. The US procured the partition of the country and propped up an unrepresentative and tyrannical regime under Ngo Dinh Diem, which made the Vietcong look preferable.
America then piled on troops and bombers and tried to intimidate the guerillas and their North Vietnamese backers into capitulation. It preached windily about the virtues of democracy while giving no clear signal as to how, if or when the country would be reunited. War weariness ensued among Americans, exacerbated by a draft which forced many middle class children to become fugitives or dodgers.
Bush’s lack of preparation for the post-firefight stage of the Iraq occupation has echoes of the way America blundered into South East Asia. This time more attention has been paid to legitimising majority consent of the indigenes– referenda, elections– but the country has been partitioned de facto with the Kurds set aside. The doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ has been as ineffective against Sunni militants and Shi’ite theocratic warriors as it was against Communist insurgents. Daily life for most non-political Iraqis is harder than under Saddam in the post-Gulf War period. Only lately has the US begun to talk of incorporating insurgent elements into the political process. But instead of a Templer-like deadline, Bush talks vaguely about ‘staying the course’ without defining it, and the country is looted by mercenary corporations and their local contact men.
Americans are more squeamish about taking and dishing out casualties than in the 1960s, when memories of WW2 and compulsory service were fresher in more memories. There is no draft to fire up protests this time, but anti-war campaigners have faster means of disseminating their message than in the days when a few TV networks and a handful of elite newspapers controlled the flow of information and tended to side with Big Brother.
All this leads one to suspect that the bipartisan calls for withdrawal from congressmen undoubtedly inspired by their forces contacts, such as Reps. Murtha and Reid, will swell irresistibly. Already leaks about cutting down the numbers engaged from 150,000 to under 100,000 by the end of next year are emanating from government. Obviously the Iraqis are in no fit state to take over prosecution of the counter-insurgency– apart from anaything else, they are now riddled with ex-Ba’athist officers and the police forces are run by mullahs and bandit chiefs. So the prognosis is for a face-saving, phased scuttle like Vietnam, about which some diehards still say ‘We didn’t lose– we left in 1973 and Saigon fell in 1975’. One imagines a similar line will be shot to exculpate Bush of what Martin van Creveld calls the biggest military blunder since Augustus sent two legions over the Rhine.
Luniversal,
There was no real problem with Augustus sending three legions over the Rhine, attempting to shorten the Imperial frontier line was thoroughly rational. The problem was the manner in which Publius Quinctilius Varus allowed himself to be led into ambush.
THAT was the blunder, not the Roman presence in Germany. In fact, if Germany had been Romanised over the next four hundred years in the manner in which Gaul had been the Western Empire may not have fallen.
Highly questionable analysis.
An add-on to Stephen’s comment above:
the data is noisy, but it does not appear that Coalition casualties are declining.
There were spikes in April and Nov of 2004, but the 12 month moving average has steadily risen — and made a new high in October.
From a larger perspective, the predictions of military professionals (defined broadly to include folks like William Lind and Martin van Creveld) who have disagreed with the war have been far more accurate than its supporters.
For example, the author of the DNI report mentioned above has been writing these since Sept 2003, and has proved quite prescient.
I doubt many supporters of the war have similar records.
“Interesting sort of conflict; one where both sides are losing.”
Not such a novel concept.
A graph of Coalition dead in both Iraq and Afghanistan:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/iraq_fatalities.pdf(Link)
Not much a pattern visible. The combined monthly total is slowly increasing, as it has since for the past year or so.
Data from Iraq Coalition Casualties:
(Link)
Coalition casualties, like military casualties everywhere, tend to rise when you go on the offensive.
Rising casualties may or may not be an indicator of defeat – it depends on the context. If our casualties spike only when we go on the offensive, and we manage to hold what we gain on those offensives, then by no means do they presage our defeat in Iraq.
D-Day, after all, presented a real spike in Allied casualties in WWII. It was not a precursor to Allied defeat in WWII.
Guerilla warfare is a fascinating subject. The secret to waging one is to keep the pressure on,
So far, the insurgents are doing that.
keep the general population “on side” or else cowed
Certainly the Kurds aren’t on-side or cowed by the insurgents, and I wonder the extent to which the Shiites are. As for the Sunnis, messages are mixed – there are reports that they insurgency is wearing out its welcome even in that community.
have lots of money and material support from outside
I would say the insurgents have this, although I suspect the Syrian border and the logistics lines from Syria are about to become a lot less supportive in the near future.
and fight a propaganda war very cleverly.
This is still the $64,000 question in Iraq. There are indications that the Islamists are losing support in the region, one of the two major theaters of the info-war, as they are forced to fight there. I would say the info-war in the West is pretty much at a stalemate right now, with the usual anti-Western sorts doing what they do, but not gaining any real additional traction.