Reflections of a former British civil servant on the likely war against Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein. A measured and calm overview of the reasons for and arguments why we should remove Saddam Hussain… and kill the murderous, ruthless son of a bitch!
The upcoming war to remove Saddam Hussein was planned in the aftermath of the 11th September attacks in Washington and has been supported more-or-less willingly by the British Government. It would appear that London and Washington decided that, for a combination of reasons, the containment of Saddam’s regime was no longer enough, and that he must be removed. As far as an outsider can gather, this conclusion was not reached for any individual reason, but because the cumulative force of a number of individual factors made the risks implied by Saddam’s continuance in office too great. The reasons encompassed Saddam’s past, present and possible future acts:
- Saddam might acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, particularly since the weapons inspectors had been banned from Iraq since 1998. Many of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that he was supposed to destroy under UN Security Council Resolution 687, the ceasefire which ended the 1991 Gulf War, are unaccounted for.
- Saddam might pass such weaponry onto terrorists. He has a long pedigree of helping terrorists, such as Abu Nidal, who died in Baghdad, and the PLO, and of sanctioning his intelligence services to commit acts of terrorism when it suits his interests – the murder of Gerald Bull in Brussels, the attempted murder of George Bush senior in Kuwait in 1993 and the assassination of some Iraqi opposition leaders.
- Saddam is the only current world leader who has a record of using WMDs, both against his own people at Halabja in 1988 and against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war.
- Saddam has a record of starting aggressive wars, against Iran in 1980, Kuwait in 1990 and Israel in 1991. None of these countries posed any threat to Iraq at the time.
- Iraq is in breach of twenty-two provisions in nine Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 687 and Resolution 1441.
- The internal nature of Saddam’s regime and the sufferings of the Iraqi people, which have been widely circulated since Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, inspire revulsion in Britain and the United States.
- The fall of the Iraqi regime, and the installation of a more democratic form of government in Baghdad, could provide the Arab world with a democratic role model.
- The Israelis, Washington’s only reliable friend in the Middle East, would be fully secured from an adversary, albeit one who had passed his prime.
From the timing of the move to war, which began in Spring 2002, it appears that the first two factors, involving weapons of mass destruction and fear of terrorism, were decisive. Of course, there is no such thing as the ‘Washington mind’, and different officials will have attached different weightings to each reason. The speedy rout of the Taliban in Afghanistan left America’s armed forces both available and confident, and the absence of any significant, conspicuous threat such as the Soviet Union completed the triad of means, motive and opportunity.
All of the reasons commonly advanced against the war make better slogans than rational arguments:
- “It’s all about oil.”
This argument can be dismissed on three grounds. First, Iraq had just as much oil throughout the 1990’s and before the 11th September as it does now. If Britain and the United States, both of whom produce their own oil, had truly been motivated by a desire to access Iraq’s oil reserves, they would never have imposed sanctions, or maintained them in the teeth of significant public hostility. Second, Saddam has given the West ample motivation to seek his downfall. Thirdly, the United States and Great Britain have frequently intervened in countries in which they have no conceivable economic interests, for security reasons, e.g. Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone. - “Under international law, specific UN Security Council authority is required”.
This can be dismissed because, in failing to disarm, Iraq has breached the ceasefire provisions, embodied in Resolution 687, which ended the first Gulf War in 1991, and in refusing to disclose fully its WMD and to cooperate with the inspectors, it has violated Resolution 1441. In any case, international law is not the United Nations, and the United Nations is not international law. Indeed, international law is a very vague and amorphous concept – a bundle of treaties, vague principles and pious hopes. It may be better to jettison the entire concept. - “The war could have unforeseen, dangerous consequences in the Middle East”.
Any war could have dangerous consequences, and so could doing nothing. It could also have positive consequences, depending on how it is waged. Of itself, this is not a convincing argument for inactivity. - “Intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state to change its system of government is unprecedented”.
In fact, such intervention is thoroughly precedented. For example, the British, French and Israelis aimed to depose Nasser in Suez in 1956, the Americans attacked Cuba in 1961 to remove Castro, invaded Grenada in the 1980’s to depose that island’s communist dictatorship, intervened in Panama in 1989 to eliminate the drug lord, Noriega, and sent troops into Somalia to rescue that country from drug lords in 1992. None of those countries posed the threats to the rest of the world, or had the record of aggression that Iraq currently does. - “It would have been better if Britain or America had not supplied Saddam with arms in the 1980’s”.
Again, this is no counter-argument for attacking him now. It is important that this ancient red herring not be dragged across the trail again. Britain and America were probably the least guilty of any of the major powers of supplying Saddam Hussein with sophisticated weaponry or materials to build his weapons of mass destruction, or to fight the Iranians. They did supply a small amount of dual use technology, and some low-tech weaponry, but Saddam got his high-tech weapons from the Russians and the French, his chemical weapons technology from West Germany, and his nuclear reactors from the French. See here for an impressive list of the equipment supplied to the Iraqis. - “Wouldn’t the money be better spent on foreign aid/local housing/health/education/transport/government project of choice?”
This argument involves weighing apples against oranges. It usually implies that insufficient funds are being spent on the competing government programme. Spending money on transport infrastructure will be no use, however, if that infrastructure is paralysed by terrorist attacks, and much higher health spending will be needed if biological weapons are released by terrorists on the open societies of the west. - “If we attack Iraq, shouldn’t we also attack Israel/North Korea/Saudi Arabia/Syria/other country?”.
Once more, not a counter-argument. However, while Israel may have violated UN Security Council resolutions, and North Korea may have weapons of mass destruction, neither state has the weighty list of charges against it that Iraq does (see above). - “Haven’t the Iraqi people suffered enough?”
Indeed they have, but the best guarantee for their future welfare is good government in Iraq, not a continuation of Saddam’s regime with associated crocodile tears from editorials in New York, London and Paris. The likely civilian casualties in any war have to be offset against the human rights abuses to be committed by Saddam’s regime if it continues in office.
Sir Humphrey, the Not-so-civil
As the Economist pointed out in an article on October 10, 2002, there are two kinds of UN resolutions, one group (Chapter Six) being far less serious than the Chapter Seven resolutions of the Security Council.
Israel is in violation of Chapter Six resolutions, not Chapter Seven. The UN is acting within its own rules by sancitoning Iraq and not Israel, and arguing otherwise shows either ignorance or deliberate disregard of the facts.
The entire article is quoted, in full, at http://www.factsofisrael.com/load.php?p=http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/archives/000421.html
Not that I really care about what the UN, but in regard to Israel and Iraq, and the issue of sancitoning either one of them, the UN is acting within its own set of rules by sanctioning Iraq and not Israel.
The main argument of the anti war libertarians (ex: Ron Paul) was missed in the article above.
It is: “There is no proof” – no proof that Saddam has connection to terrorists, and no proof that he is an immediate threat to the US or Britain.
IMO that’s an evasion, a refusal to face the facts. But this is their argument.
“There is no proof” also of course means “I do not know of the proof”.
There may well be proof that cannot be published at present due to risks to sources, etc.
The Soviet Union possessed weapons of mass destruction and was a proven threat to the West, but our policy was to maintain a credible deterrent and wait until the Soviet Union collapsed. The policy worked and we won the Cold War without firing a shot.
What’s different about Saddam?
What’s different about Saddam?
Well, for one thing, he’s a small enough target that we think we can take him out. There’s no doubt we’d have had a hot war with the Soviet Union had they been a less formidable military power.
And for another, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction can only work its balancing magic if both players who face each other are sane and equally afraid of the consequences. When you’re dealing with an individual dictator, you can never be sure of that. All of these personality cults have a bit of apres moi, le deluge about them.
But what comes afterwards? I find it hard to believe that anyone will manage to keep the country in one piece with a parlimentary democracy. Any mass revenge taking by locals will be blamed on the USA (Sabra Chatilla syndrome). Replacing Saddam with another strong man won’t make Iraq any easier to live with.
[T]he doctrine of mutually assured destruction can only work its balancing magic if both players who face each other are sane and equally afraid of the consequences. When you’re dealing with an individual dictator, you can never be sure of that.
But what reason do we have to believe that Saddam is so insane that he will not be deterred by the threat of destruction if he attacks us?
That’s a point which I have repeatedly heard asserted, but I don’t think I’ve heard a convincing reason for believing it. I think it’s an important point too, because I would certainly support this war otherwise.
Well, yes, that’s going to be a tough one. Possibly insurmountably tough. There are rotten governments of all flavors in the Middle East…aristocratic, theocratic…even nominally democratic (Saddam is ‘elected’, after all).
Still, the “puppet government” we set up in Japan turned out okay, and theirs was a culture perhaps as inimical to Western-style democracy as Iraq.
I wonder if we’ll have the necessary courage (in the face of inevitable howls of protest) to take control as thoroughly this time. I wonder if we still have sufficient faith in our form of government to try and pass it along, rather than simply dominate. And I wonder if Iraqis have the mettle to profit from the experience if we do.
Well the way I see it the seeds of a new democracy are beginning in Afghanistan, and I don’t think the role of the forces there is one of control, more of protection. They protect the foetal government from external pressures such as pro Taliban warlords in order to give them time to find a suitable form of self governance.
Iraq is a great candidate for democracy with a well educated middle class and with a historically secular outlook. The post war role of the coalition forces should be to protect and to guide, protect them from other forces in the region that would no doubt try to fill the vacuum left by the removal of Saddam’s regime and to provide guidance in constructing a fair system of governance.
As for the question on Saddam’s sanity, I’m not sure how to respond, what on earth in the history of this man’s actions leads you to believe he is a rational actor?
“But what reason do we have to believe that Saddam is so insane that he will not be deterred by the threat of destruction if he attacks us?”
I think the question regarding
Saddam’s ‘rationality’ relates, in the main, to the following question: How will Saddam’s behavior CHANGE once he has obtained nuclear capabilities? Saddam can ‘threaten’ US interests in ways that don’t involve directly attacking the US. It is important to recall that the US itself will be deterred once Saddam has nuclear weapons – would Kuwait in 1991 have been ‘worth’ the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv? I doubt it. Saddam’s history indicates a willingness to take huge risks: once he has nuclear weapons, how much more risk will he be willing to assume?
I really haven’t seen a comprehensive argument supporting a true ‘deterrence’ policy. Past deterrence efforts have involved the deployment of large numbers of American troops as well as nuclear weapons. International political support is vital to successful deterrence. Is any of this feasible in the Middle East? Again, I doubt it.
As for the question on Saddam’s sanity, I’m not sure how to respond, what on earth in the history of this man’s actions leads you to believe he is a rational actor?
The mere fact that he has remained in power for over twenty years, in spite of the fact that there are many people who want to remove him.
Furthermore, I seem to recall that in the last Gulf War, it was stated that any use by him of his chemical weapons would be met with a disproportionate response. He didn’t use chemical weapons against our troops, in spite of the fact that he had used them against his own people.
My guess, judging by the history of the man’s actions, is that Saddam’s goal is to remain in power, and he has a good idea about what is necessary to achieve that goal. That suggests that a policy based on credible deterrence should be effective in preventing him from attacking us.
Of course I’m not certain that I’m correct, but what on earth in the history of this man’s actions leads you to believe he would deliberately invite his own downfall?
It is important to recall that the US itself will be deterred once Saddam has nuclear weapons – would Kuwait in 1991 have been ‘worth’ the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv? I doubt it.
But, from Saddam’s point of view, would Kuwait have been worth Bagdad?
This question is far from clear cut.
But, from Saddam’s point of view, would Kuwait have been worth Bagdad?
Why would we be more likely to repel Saddam if he used a nuke on Kuwait than if he attacked it with conventional weapons? Our history would suggest we are unlikely to interfere militarily with regimes armed with nukes, and more likely to negotiate.
Anon, it wasn’t just Kuwait. There was an excursion into Saudi Arabia.
As to regimes w/nukes, well, NK is imploding. We could be playing a waiting game.
Why would we be more likely to repel Saddam if he used a nuke on Kuwait than if he attacked it with conventional weapons?
I don’t think we would, but I think that’s rather besides the point.
Saddam invaded Kuwait after the U.S. ambassador had told him that the U.S. had no opinion on his border dispute with Kuwait. He invaded with the (in hindsight, mistaken) belief that the U.S. would not intervene.
If it had been made clear to him beforehand that any invasion would be resisted with force by the U.S., would he still have invaded?
If it had been made clear to him beforehand that any invasion would be resisted with force by the U.S., would he still have invaded?
It’s not unlikely.
We’ve made it clear to him that his refusal to disarm will be resisted with force, and he hasn’t even done a convincing job of faking it.
“Saddam invaded Kuwait after the U.S. ambassador had told him that the U.S. had no opinion on his border dispute with Kuwait. He invaded with the (in hindsight, mistaken) belief that the U.S. would not intervene.”
I wouldn’t rest real easy on a deterrence policy that depends so completely on the US avoiding the slightest diplomatic error. And, how reliable is a dictator who takes as gospel the comments of a hostile nation’s ambassador?
Like I said – where’s a realistic, comprehensive deterrence proposal? How does deterrence in the Middle East work? Can the US maintain large numbers of troops in Saudi Arabia, et al for decades? Is there any reason to believe that medium-term political support for maintenence of those troops exists in the Arab states? (not bloody likely) I’d love to support deterrence, but, based on the comments I’ve seen thus far, people who say ‘deterrence’ really mean ‘wait & see.’
If it had been made clear to him beforehand that any invasion would be resisted with force by the U.S., would he still have invaded?
It’s not unlikely.
So why hasn’t he tried to invade Kuwait again?
We’ve made it clear to him that his refusal to disarm will be resisted with force, and he hasn’t even done a convincing job of faking it.
But his refusal to disarm does not amount to an attack on us, and until now he has gambled correctly that our bombing raids on Iraq would not threaten his grip on power.
It still doesn’t strike me as convincing evidence that he would not be deterred by the threat of retaliation should he attack us.
I wouldn’t rest real easy on a deterrence policy that depends so completely on the US avoiding the slightest diplomatic error. And, how reliable is a dictator who takes as gospel the comments of a hostile nation’s ambassador?
But the ambassador’s comments were not a ‘slight diplomatic error’. The U.S. had made no prior commitment to defend Kuwait in the event of an attack. The decision to intervene was made after the invasion.
The invasion of Kuwait is not evidence that a deterrence policy could not work, because no deterrence policy was in place to begin with.
Can the US maintain large numbers of troops in Saudi Arabia, et al for decades?
Why not? You ask that question as if the alternative policy will end our troubles once we’ve won the war.
As it happens, I think that deterring Saddam from invading Saudia Arabia should be the responsibility of the Saudi’s, but that’s a separate issue, and probably a little idealistic.
It still doesn’t strike me as convincing evidence that he would not be deterred by the threat of retaliation should he attack us.
We used force to repel him from Kuwait. This is an indication that we will use force if he attacks his neighbors, too.
So why is he working so hard to build nuclear weapons? If our threats are such an effective deterrent to his aggressions, what does he need them for?
“As it happens, I think that deterring Saddam from invading Saudia Arabia should be the responsibility of the Saudi’s, but that’s a separate issue, and probably a little idealistic.”
I wonder how high the price of oil can go when the dictator of a ‘unified’ Iraq-Kuwait-Saudi Arabia decides to limit the release of supplies?
“As it happens, I think that deterring Saddam from invading Saudia Arabia should be the responsibility of the Saudi’s, but that’s a separate issue, and probably a little idealistic.”
I wonder how high the price of oil can go when the dictator of a ‘unified’ Iraq-Kuwait-Saudi Arabia decides to limit the release of supplies?
So why is he working so hard to build nuclear weapons? If our threats are such an effective deterrent to his aggressions, what does he need them for?
But the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and was also committed to spreading its ideology to other parts of the globe.
If deterrence is so ineffective, why didn’t the Soviet Union attack us?
If deterrence is so ineffective, why didn’t the Soviet Union attack us?
Now we’re starting to go in circles. See my first post on the thread.
The whole thing that makes Saddam stand out from the common-or-garden variety of psychopathic despots found in various places in the world today is that, like those in the 1930-40’s, he is very prone to attack his neighbours and not just confine his evil to those within Iraq. As a result anyone who does not see why he therefore poses an intolerable threat is not looking very hard.
anyone who does not see why he therefore poses an intolerable threat is not looking very hard.
This misses the point of my question.
I was asking, not whether he posed a threat, but whether a policy of deterrence would be effective.
Now we’re starting to go in circles. See my first post on the thread.
Indeed. Your justification that a policy of deterrence would be ineffective appears to be based on a circular argument.
Your justification that a policy of deterrence would be ineffective appears to be based on a circular argument.
And your resort to a cheap shot indicates a desperate argument.
But what reason do we have to believe that Saddam is so insane that he will not be deterred by the threat of destruction if he attacks us?
Saddam is not the only loony in the bin. I agree that Saddam probably will be deterred (but, given the consequences, “probably” isn’t good enough for me). Even if Saddam offers zero risk, however, Uday seems like too much of a nutball to trust with WMD.
But the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and was also committed to spreading its ideology to other parts of the globe.
If deterrence is so ineffective, why didn’t the Soviet Union attack us?
I must have missed the good old days when we were certain that deterrance would work against the Soviets. What wonderful, risk-free days those were… I wish we had that kind of guarantee of peace again.
You must love peace so much, that you wish us to the days that brought us the Cuban Missle crisis. Truly a great day for all the children of the world, both in the USSR and the USA.
Hey, don’t glare at me like that… YOU were the one insisting on a Soviet/Iraq parallel.
And your resort to a cheap shot indicates a desperate argument.
I hardly think so.
I’m looking for convincing reasons for believing that a deterrence policy would not be effective. I’ve yet to find such a reason. I can’t convince myself on the basis of what I already know about Saddam and I was hoping someone might tell me something that I was previously unaware of.
Ryan, I really don’t understand your point. You make it sound as if the choice is between an risky deterrence policy and a risk-free war.
Whereas the anti-war crowd would NEVER make it sound as if the choice is between aggressively making war and just letting peace blossom?
My point is that deterrence can be equally horrible as war… and sometimes worse (for example when someone calls your bluff), and that your own example proves this. Deterrance is only an acceptable option when the alternatives are worse.
Nevertheless, I will act for the moment under the assumption that you are being sincere in looking for reasons why deterrance won’t work (as opposed to having your mind already made up, and cynically affecting a faux-openminded air).
The following is not my words, here is a link to the essay it was excerpted from. Please forgive the length, I wanted to include everything relevant to your concern.
3. Saddam Hussein has the means and the motivation to develop nuclear weapons, and there is irrefutable evidence that he has tried to do so. He has shown staggering errors in judgment and a belief in his own personal infallibility by attacking Iran, Kuwait, and Israel. Iraq attaining nuclear capability therefore provides a potent and immediate threat to our allies in the region and the vital interests of the United States.
Like all dictators, Saddam runs a state apparatus ruled by fear. There is no one in his military command structure, or indeed among his party or even his sons, who are willing to give him real information, because most of that information will be bad news. This, coupled with his clinical paranoia and narcissism, have led him to absolutely appalling errors in judgment, such as assuming the Iranian people would join him in his war with Iran, the miscalculation over Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent evasion of his obligations in the years since.
Furthermore, the people who have had first-hand contact with Saddam Hussein all speak of his messianic complex. He cares not a whit about world opinion, and indeed seems preoccupied with how the people — particularly the Arabs — of 500 years hence will record him. Saddam, to put it plainly, plans to make a big splash on the pages of world history. In this he is no different than Hitler, Stalin or Pol Pot. There are no legal or behavioral inhibitions on totalitarians such as Saddam. He does whatever he wishes, and every action is met by terrified praise and false adulation from a population cowering in fear.
Therefore, it is not only likely but probable that Saddam will be tempted to use such weapons to strike back at those who have committed the unthinkable crime of embarrassing him before the world. And this is where Al Qaeda can provide him with not only the delivery mechanism, but also, to Saddam’s irrational and misinformed mind, a form of plausible deniability. His success with The Big Lie these past 11 years has emboldened him to believe – with ample justification – that there are legions of useful idiots ready to rally to the defense of anyone who dares attack America.
So we may summarize our fourth cause as follows:
4. Saddam Hussein shows irrefutable signs of mental impairment in the form of Clinical Paranoia and Narcissistic Disorder. Given control of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, his temptation to use them against the US on American soil is not mitigated by normal behavioral inhibitors, and indeed is amplified by his aberrant mental state. This poses a potent, immediate and intolerable threat to the safety and security of the people of the United States.
A close corollary to this argument can be made from the fact that Saddam routinely tortures, murders and gasses his own people. We may disagree violently with the Chinese, the Russians, the Pakistanis and the French, among others, but we do not unduly fear nuclear attack from such nations because each of them can be deterred by the unimaginable rain of destruction we would unleash upon them in return.
A self-absorbed Narcissist such as Saddam does not see people – even his own people – the way we do. They are objects to men like Saddam, props and extras the enhance the panoply and glory of their lives. Brave German generals disobeyed Hitler’s orders to destroy everything that remained intact in Germany during the final weeks of the Third Reich. Like all dictators, he saw the impending end of his own life as the final curtain on his nation’s history…and what happened to the extras in his biopic was completely irrelevant.
Saddam has taken the cradle of civilization, one of the most enlightened and educated populations in the middle east, and driven it to utter ruin in the service to his own vainglorious ambitions. The money designated to feed and care for his people under the UN sanctions he has used to build mad palaces of sickening opulence under the noses of his starving children. And yet there are those that say the threat of reprisal against his nation is sufficient to keep him in line.
Nonsense. Saddam has to die someday. And when he goes, he clearly means to take whatever he can with him. Therefore:
5. Saddam has repeatedly shown his contempt and bitter disregard for the welfare of his own people. He has totally neglected all of the misery they have endured since his ascension to power, and is therefore undeterrable and immune to fear of reprisal against his nation and his people.
No one disputes that nuclear weapons are dangerous. No one disputes that Saddam is dangerous. So why do legions of people argue that Saddam with nuclear weapons is somehow not dangerous?
Nevertheless, I will act for the moment under the assumption that you are being sincere in looking for reasons why deterrance won’t work (as opposed to having your mind already made up, and cynically affecting a faux-openminded air).
If my mind were already made up, I would be attempting to make a convincing argument for my own position, rather than inviting others to make a counter argument in order simply to nay-say them. I can think of more enjoyable ways of wasting my time.
But thanks for posting that extract. Do you know of any other pieces – a book, say – which fleshes out the argument in more detail?