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Rafe Champion pops Will Wilkinson

In response to Will Willkinson on the The Fly Bottle taking our esteemed generalissimo Perry de Havilland to task for supporting the conjectural objective epistemology of Karl Popper, the Samizdata Team decided that we should wheel up the big guns for our response. Rafe Champion a noted Australian independent scholar of Popper replies to Will.

Will Wilkinson has invoked a number of weary and worn out arguments against Popper’s theory of inquiry and his theory of knowledge. First of all it is helpful to understand that Popper is concerned with understanding the way the world works, with learning by imaginative problem solving and making the best use of our critical faculties. It is also helpful to understand how Popper has emancipated us from some dead ends in philosophy, and not just the philosophy of science. Many of these dead ends arise from the theory that scientific knowledge is a form of belief, to wit, justified true belief. The source of justification in the empiricist tradition is supposed to be the evidence of our senses. In the Continental rationalist tradition the source of justification is the intuition of clear and distinct ideas. In each case the same fatal flaw arises: there is no way to decisively (certainly) justify the beliefs that are supposed to be true.

Popper has provided an alternative to the failed theories of justified true belief. The alternative is a theory of conjectural objective knowledge. This does not mean giving up on truth, or the search for it. Truth is a regulative standard for statements. A true statement corresponds to the facts. In our search for the truth we form critical preferences for the theory (or the social policy) which best solves its problems and stands up to all kinds of tests (the test of internal consistency, consistency with other well tested theories, and experimental or observational tests). Our preferences can change in a rational and controlled manner in the light of new evidence or new arguments. Our knowledge grows through our creative response to problems, including the problems that are created by effective criticism.

The Popperian scientists is like a free market entrepreneur, seeking opportunities (unsolved problems) in the marketplace. The scientist forms a conjectural solution to the problem (invests or offers a product in the marketplace) and it is then subjected to critical appraisal, including experimental tests (the product is tested by the market). All this goes on in the flux of time and is subject to radical uncertainty due to the inherently open-ended nature of theoretical knowledge (and the dynamic marketplace).

All of this is simple common sense until David Stove and the proponents of justified true beliefs confuse the picture.

Will wrote:

“Popper argues that one can only disconfirm a theory–prove that it is false”.

In logic, that is the simple truth. A general or universal theory, stated in the form “All swans are white” is falsified by a single (true) report of a black swan.

“But then what do you say of a theory that has been subjected to huge numbers of potentially falsifying tests, but has passed with flying colors? Isn’t not being falsified by many tests a lot like being confirmed?”

That was the case with Newton’s theory which passed many tests and explained so many things that many people thought that the final truth had been found. But it was not so, even before Einstein offered a viable alternative there were known to be problems with Newton’s theory. If you want to limit confirmation to repeatable observations, like sunrises and falling apples, then that is scientifically trivial and uninteresting because science is concerned with general explanatory theories, (which apply to both apples and sunrises).

“Pace Popper, induction works just fine, and it works pretty much the way people intuitively think it does (i.e., The more horses you encounter, the surer your knowledge about horses in general.)”

Not really. To learn about horses you need to approach them in a receptive, inquisitive or problem-solving way. If you merely encounter them “in passing” you may learn nothing more than to get out of their way. Learning is an active process of sifting and evaluating ideas and evidence, that is why so many people can go through school and higher education and learn next to nothing (exept about things that they really find interesting, which may be horses and not their academic studies). When you understand where Popper is coming from, David Stove is just a bore, despite his wit and his verbal pyrotechnics. Stove and his fellow inductivists apparently think there is some way to attach a numerical probability to general theories, but it has not yet been done despite being an academic industry for about a hundred years. This renders their position absurd by their own standards.

Rafe Champion

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