I liked the way he repeated the concepts, generally accepted beliefs, and generally recognized problems over and over. I also liked the way he reviewed and discussed the border between an approximately determinist view (Einstein) and a more probabalist/uncertainty view (ie Bohr).

I’ll probably watch them again because he frames the field very well for laymen to understand. Thank you for those links. Food for thought.

“The behaviour of particles cannot be explained by ‘injecting’ random numbers into a universe that otherwise operates deterministically. “

Up the thread I drew the connection between free will and random outcomes on the logical assumption that if a response is determined by prior events, it is “not random” IOW, determinist. If it is not determined by prior events, it must (not may but “must”) have at least one randomizing variable.

It will be interesting to see if Conway and Kochens’ work deals with the obstacle of distinguishing random from unrecognized chaotic by observation alone. You’ve pointed me at some interesting stuff. Thanks.

I’ll have to apologise on two fronts here. Firstly I haven’t had time to read and digest all the discussion so far. And secondly I haven’t done so with Conway’s ‘Free Will Theorem’ either. But thought I’d strike while the iron is hot as I suspect that it might be of relevance for those of a mathematical/philosophical bent.

One thing I cannot stress enough (and it goes to part of JV’s latest comment): There is no, NO, non-trivial and logically consistent system of thought that does not rest upon postulates: unproven presumptions about existents within the system and relationships between them, which are the originating “givens” of the system. This is as as true of moral philosophy as it is of any other system. In reasoning about the nature of humans and their faculties (such as free will) you will always hit up on an unprovable assumption.

Here we go….

In the more common, or conventional, or traditional conception of “free will,” there is some faculty of human beings which serves as a prime mover–i.e., it is causeless–and yet, simultaneously, it is under the control of the human, the moral agent, the actor. This has been a problem for Western (at least) philosophers since the Greeks. Miss Rand, among others, tried to get around this by saying No, the faculty is not “causeless”–it is caused by the human will. But this begs the question (i.e., the argument already assumes that which is to be proven), because the “causeless” faculty under discussion is the will itself. The question, as always, is, How comes the Will to will as it does?

For religions which posit the existence of a “soul” distinct from the physical body, this need not* pose a problem; for them, the Soul is the essence of what we are and the driver of what we do, and Free Will simply means that God or the gods allow the Soul to direct, or at least to strongly influence, the person’s actions as it will, without His or their intervention. And they are quite welcome to their understanding, their fundamental postulate; the following analysis is not for them, but for those who are trying to square a reliable principle of cause-and-effect with “Free Will,” whose existence is to most of us (I think) self-evident.

*[If the religion posits some version of Predestination, the situation can be different. Such doctrines I think are not at issue here, and to discuss them would take us way too far afield.]

But for the rest of us, it is a problem.

Now, it is the nature of the human mind that, having formed a concept and then having found the concept logically problematic–or wanting in some other respect–it will seek a different angle, a change to the concept so as to get around the problem. This cannot always be done, but in the case of the concept of Free Will, I think the conventional concept is based on a misunderstanding and must be re-cast slightly if we are to maintain our belief that we live in a cause-and-effect (that is, a rational) universe and yet hold to the idea that real choice exists for each of us, and that we are indeed properly held accountable for the choices we make.

So, in short:

“Free Will” arises from the fact that a being possessing the faculty of “will” is not completely constrained from without to behave in a certain manner. It–the being, the entity–is constantly faced with choices. “Shall I turn east or west? Shall I hunt for a job or go on welfare?” It is the system of internal mechanisms, considered in their totality as the system of which the acting being consists, which both enable and require that being to act as it does in any given situation.

Thus, in what I believe is a much better conception of “Free Will” than the common one, it is the whole man, not some human subsystem or ancillary system, that has “free will” or the ability to “choose”; and this “free will” lies in the perception of the observer, whether he is some other person external to the actor or is the actor observing himself, and not in the disconnection of some subsystem of the acting entity from physical reality and the laws of cause-and-effect which make that reality available to human reason.

There is a real capacity to choose, and there is real free will, in that it is only the acting individual himself who picks and then acts upon one particular alternative among more than one available.

I’m hoping to put up a somewhat fuller discussion of this either tonight or tomorrow at countingcats.com, if anyone’s interested.

So there’s a down side to not believing in free will (though only if it actually does exist), but no down side to believing in it, whether it exists or not. Therefore, belief in free will is the rational choice.

you may want to go back and read my very first comment in this thread.

I hold the same opinion on free will as Michael. My observation is that people who believe in predeterminism and act on that belief are definitely, er, not well adapted to survive much less prosper. Whether my choices are predetermined by the laws of physics or not, I perceive free will and act accordingly.

The passivity that often accompanies belief in determinism, is itself a choice. Whether the choice one makes is predetermined is a philosophical question, not a practical one. Predetermined or not, one still chooses.

I think this thread is reaching the point of repetition. Long threads tend to do that.

If you can present a rational argument that solidly and rationally debunks the possibility of determinism, not one based on your feelings or guesses about consequences, then I am interested. If not, let’s just agree to play by the same rules even if we cannot agree on the reason for those rules.

What if I present an argument that solidly and rationally debunks not believing in free will, will that do?

Suppose that free will exists, but you choose to believe that it doesn’t. Odds are, since you subscribe to a rational concept of choice without free will, you will make the same choices you would have made if you believed in free will, so your false belief won’t likely lead to too much trouble. Nevertheless, it’s certainly conceivable that a false belief could lead to negative consequences (they do tend to). Plus, if you live long enough you’ll be proven wrong, which is always annoying.

Now suppose that free will does not exist, but you chose to believe that it does. You will be just as wrong as in the above example, but what could it possibly matter that you’re wrong? To whom could it matter? Your awareness of your wrongness is just an illusion anyway, so that’s not a problem. There’s no God or absolute consciousness to offend, so that’s not a problem. So long as there’s no free will, it makes not a jot of difference whether you’re right or wrong, or which way you choose to believe.

So there’s a down side to not believing in free will (though only if it actually does exist), but no down side to believing in it, whether it exists or not. Therefore, belief in free will is the rational choice.

“We are developing the social individualist meta-context for the future.”

If finding a way that people from as different of personal belief systems as you and I can cooperate to “oppose anyone and anything that seeks to put men in chains, especially chains upon their will and minds “, then this discussion is core to my understanding of the purpose of Samizdata.

During this discussion, in a strange way, I feel like I have been arguing with my own younger self. I was raised in a devout fundamentalist Christian family. My present ‘theology’ if you will, came from the realization that if God wrote the laws of physics, and I can find clear and honest demonstration of those laws of physics, then that is God speaking directly, in the first person. Anyone who is arguing against them is arguing against God’s laws and God.

A bunch of human middle men prefacing their statements with “God told me …” who then make claims that defy the unmistakable laws of physics, of God in the first person, do not get the benefit of the doubt. ‘Miracles’ imply a system in need of a ‘program patch’, not the creation of a perfect God. Alternative creation theories and refutations of the possibility of things like dinosaurs (not unusual ‘back in the day’) or the age of the stars would require a deceiving creator God putting false evidence into his creation.

If a perfect creator created a perfect system, then ‘miraculous’ tampering with that system is either fixing something that is broken, or caprice. Neither is compatible with the concept of a perfect God so either the concept of a perfect God is flawed or the claims of miracles and other denials of hard evidence are flawed. Even accusing someone of defying God’s law is demeaning to an all-powerful being. When God writes a law, like gravity, you don’t defy it, you demonstrate it.

At some point, it dawned on me that if there is a God, the surest and safest way to know and learn his will is to study the physics of Creation (existence), not to rely on the words of self professed prophets and intermediaries. If there is no God, then the best choice is to study and learn the laws of physics and reality. In other words, an honest seeker of God not looking for shortcuts or special privileges and dispensations and claims against others should study “the laws of nature and of nature’s God” and an atheist or agnostic seeking knowledge should study the laws of physics. In either case the course of action is the same and the God question fades.

Humility can say “I don’t know” when hubris or fearful insecurity makes up a manipulative or reassuring answer.